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Eugene C. Lim* Thin-Skull Plaintiffs, Socio-Cultural
"Abnormalities" and the Dangers of an
Objective Test for Hypersensitivity
The extent to which "hypersensitivity" can serve as a legal basis for demanding
additional compensation has always been a controversial issue in tort law. A key
challenge facing courts lies in determining how the "thin-skull rule," traditionally
related to physical conditions that predispose an individual to additional injury,
can be applied to claims from "hypersensitive" plaintiffs citing personality-linked
vulnerabilities of a religious, socio-cultural, or psychiatric nature. This article
critically evaluates the viability of the "ordinary-fortitude test" adopted by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Mustapha v. Culligan, and discusses the relative
merits of a "multi-factorial test" in determining the admissibility of personality-
linked "thin-skull claims." In this regard, a fact-specific, contextual approach that
considers the causal nexus between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's
injury would provide a more flexible framework with which to measure liability than
an artificially-defined "one-size-fits-all" standard of "psychological resilience" in
an increasingly multicultural Canada.
En droit de la responsabilite civile delictuelle, la mesure dans laquelle
I'hypersensibilite peut 6tre utilisee comme base juridique pour reclamer une
indemnite additionnelle a toujours ete une question controversee. Un grand
defi que doivent relever les tribunaux est de determiner comment la doctrine
de la vulnerabilite de la victime, traditionnellement liee aux affections physiques
qui font qu'une personne est predisposee a subir des prejudices additionnels,
peut 6tre appliquee aux reclamations par des demandeurs hypersensibles qui
invoquent des vulnerabilites de nature religieuse, socioculturelle ou psychiatrique
liees a leur personnalite. L'article evalue de maniere critique la viabilite du
critere de la resilience ordinaire adopte par la Cour supreme du Canada dans
Mustapha c. Culligan, et discute du merite relatif d'un critere multifactoriel pour
determiner Iadmissibilite de reclamations liees a la personnalite et fondees sur
la doctrine de la vulnerabilite. A cet egard, une approche contextuelle, fondee
sur les faits, qui examine le lien de cause a effet entre la negligence de la partie
defenderesse et le prejudice subi par la partie demanderesse offrirait, pour
mesurer la responsabilite, une structure plus souple qu'une norme de " resilience
psychologique , universelle definie artificiellement dans un Canada de plus en
plus multiculturel.
* LLM, SJD (Toronto); Faculty Member, City University of Hong Kong School of Law.
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Introduction
A fastidious consumer with a chronic obsession for order and perfection
purchases a contaminated product which triggers an obsessive compulsive
reaction consisting of repetitive ritualistic cleansing behaviour.1 A
pedestrian who is almost run over by a drunk driver complains some
weeks later of a mysterious severe pain on one side of the body.2 A worker
seriously injured in a workplace accident refuses medical treatment on
religious grounds, and suffers permanent paralysis as a result. Despite
the seemingly diverse nature of these cases, they have one element in
common. The victims in these cases possess personality-linked socio-
cultural, religious or psychiatric traits that predispose them to additional
injury-injury which exceeds in magnitude the harm that a similarly-
situated victim without those traits would suffer. A key challenge facing
courts in considering the claims of hypersensitive plaintiffs lies in
distinguishing between harm that is causally attributable-both in fact
and in law-to the tortfeasor's negligence, and harm that is remote.
1. Compulsions are defined as repetitive behaviors or mental acts that are used to reduce anxiety.
Although the acts are typically considered by the person performing them to be senseless or irrational,
the person cannot resist performing the compulsion. The two most common forms of compulsive
behavior are reported by psychiatrists to be cleaning (in the form of repeated cleansing rituals) and
checking (where the subject is driven by fear, insecurity or paranoia to repeatedly examine that a
certain object is in place, such as a door lock). See Thomas F Oltmanns & Robert E Emery, Abnormal
Psychology, 7th ed (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson, 2012) at 143 and 144.
2. Such experiences are sometimes described as somatoform disorders, where unusual physical
symptoms appear in the absence of any known illness orphysical impairment. See Oltmanns & Emery,
ibid at 184-185. On occasion, experiences involving physical endangerment or injury may also result
in depression of a more traditional kind. Similar issues of remoteness arise for consideration when
the post-accident depression or psychiatric condition becomes serious enough to cause the victim
to attempt or commit suicide. The case of Wright Estate v Davidson provides an illustration of a car
accident victim who suffered depression and later committed suicide. The court in that case held that
the tortfeasor's liability did not extend to the victim's death, noting that there was insufficient evidence
to indicate the presence of a mental disorder pre-dating the accident. See Wright Estate v Davidson
(1992), 88 DLR (4th) 698 at 705.
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Yet, the rules governing remoteness provide only limited guidance on
the requirements for a successful action in a thin-skull claim involving
a degree of hypersensitivity or vulnerability that sets a claimant apart
from what is sometimes referred to in the jurisprudence as the "Canadian
mainstream."3
Even without the issue of hypersensitivity, liability for psychiatric
injury is generally considered a controversial area in the tort of negligence.'
The situation becomes even more complex when courts have to grapple
with issues of legal causation when a plaintiff claims additional damages
flowing from a "thin skull" or some special vulnerability. The central
difficulty facing courts lies in determining whether, and to what extent, the
"thin-skull rule," so famously articulated in cases like Smith v. Leech Brain
& Co.,5 should be applied to "sensitivities of the mind or personality" in
the same way it is applied to claims involving vulnerabilities of the body.6
The Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Mustapha v. Culligan7 has
refocused attention on the thorny issue of how to resolve thin-skull cases
with an element of personality-based hypersensitivity or vulnerability,
even though the judgment in favour of Culligan was not entirely
expected.8 Although the decision in Mustapha is already several years
old, the questions that were raised in that case remain controversial, and
will continue to animate debates on how far the protective arm of the law
should extend in respect of "psychologically vulnerable" claimants.
3. See Vaughan Black, "Cultural Thin Skulls" (2010) 60 UNB LJ 186 at 187 and 201-202, who also
refers to "majority cultural backgrounds" in the context of emphasizing the cultural specificity of all
plaintiffs, including those purportedly belonging to the so-called "mainstream."
4. Linden & Feldthusen note that foreseeability remains the major criterion for determining the
limits of tort responsibility, but certain interests (such as receiving compensation for mental suffering)
are still imperfectly protected. Courts have traditionally placed emphasis on assuring "bodily security"
over and above more "ephemeral" and less immediate interests. While the notion of "duty of care"
was traditionally employed to rein in the scope of negligence liability in such "ephemeral" cases,
the "neighbour principle," articulated in the seminal case of Donoghue v Stevenson, [ 1932] AC 562
[Donoghue v Stevenson], has led to a more permissive regime for recovery, owing to the recognition
of a generalized duty of care. However, Linden & Feldthusen are quick to point out that despite
Donoghue v Stevenson, the courts have not swept away all vestiges of their "earlier reticence." See
Allen M Linden & Bruce Feldthusen, Canadian Tort Law, 9th ed (Markham, ON: LexisNexis, 2011)
at 425.
5. [1962] 2 QB 405.
6. It is interesting to note that courts in the United Kingdom have begun to make inroads into
recognizing personality as a possible basis for a thin-skull claim. See, e.g., Malcolm v Broadhurst,
[1970] 3 All ER 508 at 511 where it is noted that there is "no difference in principle between an egg-
shell skull and an egg-shell personality[.]"
7. 2008 SCC 27, [2008] 2 SCR 114 [Mustapha].
8. See MH Ogilvie, "The Fly in the Bottle and Psychiatric Damage in Consumer Law" (2010) 2
J Bus L 85 at 88, where it is noted that the Supreme Court handed down a brief seven-page decision
rejecting Mustapha's claim, to the "considerable surprise" of the legal community in Canada.
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This article seeks to explore the legal significance of socio-cultural,
religious, psychological or other personality-based factors that may
predispose a thin-skull victim to a higher than expected magnitude of
injury-whether of a psychiatric or physical nature. One thin-skull
scenario might involve a mental condition-such as obsessive compulsive
disorder-which produces a heightened psychiatric reaction to a negligent
act. In another, religious beliefs might prohibit an injured claimant
from seeking medical treatment, causing the physical injuries to further
worsen. While Mustapha was not primarily a case involving religious
sensitivity or physical injury, the Supreme Court's endorsement of an
objective-fortitude test may create difficulties in the future for claimants
with specific psychological, religious, cultural or other "non-mainstream"
qualities seeking additional compensation for injuries arising from their
unique vulnerabilities. The concern here is not with the Supreme Court's
(arguably justified) dismissal of Mustapha's claim per se, but with the
possible limitations that an objective fortitude test would have in evaluating
when (if ever) cultural factors or psychiatric vulnerabilities may be
admissible, for the purpose of imposing additional liability, in future cases
involving thin-skull claimants. In this regard, it will be proposed in this
article that Canadian tort law needs to develop a sufficiently nuanced test
to distinguish between cultural or psychiatric factors that may give rise to
an actionable thin-skull claim and those which simply lack the requisite
foreseeability to support an action for additional damages.
This article will use the Supreme Court's decision as a springboard
to discuss two issues relating to liability in thin-skull cases involving
hypersensitivity. First, it will explore whether the primary/secondary victim
dichotomy, which appears to have been endorsed by earlier Canadian
decisions, has survived the holding in Mustapha. It will argue that the
Supreme Court wisely side-stepped the issue of Mustapha's classification
as a victim, thereby avoiding the rather artificial strictures of evaluating
the recoverability of mental harm through a test based rigidly on the risk of
direct physical endangerment to the victim or others. The Supreme Court's
silence on the issue of classification is justified in the circumstances,
although it could possibly be surmised that the decision was not primarily
designed to jettison the "victimhood" dichotomy entirely.
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Second, the article will critically analyze the Court's endorsement and
application of the ordinary-fortitude test.9 It will be suggested that while
such a test might be viewed as an essential tool to rein in the bounds of
negligence liability, it creates the risk of subjecting claimants to a culturally
polarizing, politically alienating and subjective hypothetical standard
which measures one's mental constitution against an idealized fictional
notion of resilience. This article argues that no single "standard" is capable,
on its own, of providing a suitable yardstick with which to measure the
remoteness of a victim's claim. Rather, it will be proposed that a fact-
specific, multi-factorial contextual-forseeability test1" for remoteness that
explores considerations such as the nature of the claimant's "underlying
personality-based condition," the constitutionality of the claimant's beliefs
(if applicable), the requirement of taking steps to mitigate threats to one's
health and well-being in the absence of any strong moral prohibition, the
presence of conscious choice in exposing oneself to danger,11 the balance
of rights between the claimant and alleged tortfeasor, as well as the causal
nexus between the defendant's actions and the plaintiff's specific injury,
would, taken together, furnish a more flexible and appropriate set of
guidelines with which to resolve issues of liability in thin-skull claims
involving a degree of hypersensitivity. In this respect, it will be argued that
the law relating to hypersensitivity can benefit from some of the insights
9. This test determines whether a claimant with a particular sensitivity can recover by comparing
the claimant's reaction with that of the hypothetical individual of reasonable mental robustness or
fortitude. If such an individual would not have suffered psychiatric injury in the circumstances,
then the claimant with the particular vulnerability of sensitivity would not be eligible to recover
compensation. The Supreme Court of Canada was not, of course, the first court to apply this test. The
ordinary-fortitude test had already been applied in earlier cases such as White v Chief Constable of
South Yorkshire Police, [1999] 1 All ER 1 [White], and the Canadian case of Vanek v Great Atlantic
and Pacific Co of Canada Ltd, [1999] 48 OR (3d) 228 (CA) [Vanek].
10. It has been suggested that a balancing exercise that weighs the plaintiff's dignity against the
defendant's rights within a highly fact- specific framework would provide courts with sufficient room for
manoeuvrability in determining the scope of civil liability. See, e.g., Olga Redko, "Religious Practice
as a 'Thin Skull' in the Context of Civil Liability" (2014) 72 UT Fac L Rev 38 at 71, who advocates,
for the consideration of claims involving "religious thin skulls," the approach adopted by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Syndicat Northcrest vAmselem, 2004 SCC 47, [2004] 2 SCR 551, where the court
resolved the conflict between the plaintiff's religious freedom and the defendant's contractual rights,
through recourse to section 9.1 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. This article
suggests that an individualized, fact-specific balancing exercise that takes into account sensitivities of
a non-religious nature can be productively applied to claims involving personality-based elements in
general, including claims concerning socio-cultural or psychiatric vulnerabilities.
11. Costs that the plaintiff is deemed to have accepted by, for instance, voluntarily or consciously
engaging in potentially risky or dangerous activity, will not generally be recoverable from the
tortfeasor as part of a thin skull claim for additional compensation This consideration-relating to
the awareness and acceptance of danger-may be pertinent both at the remoteness stage of evaluating
legal causation, as well as the defence stage of the negligence analysis. Evidence of contributory
negligence by the plaintiff, for example, might reduce the extent of the defendant's liability.
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that have been formulated in the literature concerning socio-cultural and
religious-based harm, such as the work by Marc Ramsay and Vaughan
Black, discussed later. Whether harm-psychiatric or otherwise-is
foreseeable in a given case, particularly in cases involving individualistic
traits which predispose claimants to additional injury, is almost invariably
a question of fact. A test that is capable of accommodating factual,
context-specific determinations of foreseeability would be more suitable
for adjudicating claims in a diverse society than an artificial objective
standard which imposes a one-size-fits-all threshold against which all
thin-skull claims are judged.
I. Facts of the case
The facts ofMustapha v. Culligan are perhaps among the most memorable
in the history of product liability law since Donoghue v Stevenson12 in the
United Kingdom.13 The plaintiff, Mustapha, had for a period of fifteen
years purchased large bottles of water from the defendant, Culligan of
Canada, for consumption by his family.14 On one occasion, when replacing
an empty bottle with a full one, Mustapha noticed a dead fly and the
remnants of another in the unopened replacement bottle supplied by the
defendant.15 Neither Mustapha nor his family members consumed the
contents of the bottle. 16
The string of events that flowed from this fateful discovery is
noteworthy in light of the impact that it had on Mustapha's mental health.
The sight of the dead flies in the water triggered in Mustapha an obsessive
compulsive reaction that affected his ability to function productively.
Shocked by the "revolting implications"" that the dead flies in the
drinking water would have had on the health of his family, he became
obsessed with cleanliness and was unable to take showers.18 His personal
and professional life suffered, and his business declined.19 His condition
was considered severe enough to constitute recognised psychiatric injury
12. Donoghue v Stevenson, supra note 4.
13. Product liability cases in the line of Donoghue v Stevenson generally involve a claimant
discovering a contaminant or foreign object in a product of manufacture, which subsequently results
in injury-either physical or psychiatric-to the claimant. Examples of product-liability based
psychiatric injury cases in Canada include Taylor v Weston Bakeries, [1976] 1 CCLT 158 (where the
victim discovered metal and blue mould in bread) and Curll v Robin HoodMultifoods Ltd (1974), 56
DLR (3d) 129.
14. Mustapha, supra note 7 at para 1.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid, where it is noted that the bottle remained unopened.
17. Ibid.
18. Ogilvie, supra note 8 at 87.
19. Ibid.
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of a "serious and prolonged nature" and he was diagnosed as suffering
from a major depressive disorder, phobia and anxiety.2"
Mustapha claimed damages against Culligan for his psychiatric
injuries, and was awarded compensation, including general and special
damages, at the trial level.21 The trial judge, in finding for Mustapha,
applied a subjective test for sensitivity, taking into account the plaintiff's
"cultural factors" and particular vulnerabilities to emotional harm.22
However, the finding of the trial court was overturned on appeal. The
Supreme Court, in affirming the reversal by the Court of Appeal, held that
Mustapha's psychiatric injury was too remote to allow recovery.23 While
Culligan owed a duty of care to Mustapha and had breached the standard
of care by supplying a defective product, 4 Mustapha's claim failed on
grounds of causation. Although the factual cause of Mustapha's depressive
disorder was the defendant's negligence, it was not the cause in law; 5
Mustapha had failed to demonstrate that a person of "ordinary fortitude"
would have suffered severe mental harm upon seeing the dead flies in the
water.26 In this regard, Mustapha's reaction to the flies was unusual and
extreme, and while his debilitating depressive disorder was imaginable, it
was not reasonably foreseeable.
27
Mustapha's claim against Culligan for psychiatric damage raises
interesting issues about whether thin-skull claimants are entitled to
recover for the full extent to which they sustain injury. At the heart of the
Supreme Court's decision is the finding that hypersensitive individuals
do not receive additional protection under the law by the mere fact of
their hypersensitivity. Mustapha's claim for compensation was simply
not tenable because the chain of legal causation had, in the view of the
Supreme Court, been broken by remoteness and a lack of foreseeability.
Despite its apparent clarity and simplicity, Mustapha has left a
somewhat uncertain legacy. Questions relating to the interpretation of
"hypersensitivity" and its significance for recovery are likely to challenge
future courts in thin-skull cases. In particular, to what extent will the
classification of a claimant as a primary or secondary victim continue to
be relevant in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision? And under what
20. Mustapha, supra note 7 at paras 1 and 10.
21. Ibid at para 2.
22. Ibid at para 18.
23. Ibid at paras 3 and 20.
24. Ibid at para 7.
25. Ibid at para 3.
26. Ibid at para 18.
27. Ibid at para 15.
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circumstances will emotional or personality-based susceptibility to harm
constitute a recognized basis for additional compensation? This article
will consider each of these issues in turn.
II. UWhither the primary/secondary victim dichotomy?
There was no attempt to categorize Mustapha as either a "primary" or
"secondary" victim of psychiatric injury in the Supreme Court's decision,28
and for good reason. Whether Mustapha was directly endangered by the
defendant's carelessness, which would in turn determine whether he was
a primary victim, was not a crucial factor in the determination of liability.
Yet, an issue that will likely face Canadian courts in the post-Mustapha
era is the significance of the primary/secondary victim dichotomy, what
weight (if any) to attach to it, and its larger implications for the tort of
negligence in Canada.
Traditionally, whether a duty of care is owed to a plaintiff claiming
for psychiatric injury was contingent upon the plaintiff's status as either
a primary or secondary victim.29 While courts generally continue to
approach the issue of recovery for psychiatric injury with a certain degree
of reluctance, developments in the common law over the course of the
past century have resulted in the judicial recognition of situations in which
recovery for psychiatric injury is more likely to be available.30 It is now
generally accepted in the common law of England that victims of nervous
shock can be divided into primary31 and secondary victims. Primary
victims fall within the "range of foreseeable physical injury"32 by directly
experiencing traumatic events such as disasters and accidents, and are
eligible to recover if their psychiatric injury arises from fear for their own
28. Ogilvie, supra note 8 at 91.
29. See, e.g., Dulieu v W4Vhite & Sons, [1901] 2 KB 669 at 681 [Dulieu], in whichKennedy J outlined
a test for shock arising from "reasonable fear of immediate personal injury to oneself," and Hambrook
v Stokes Brothers, [1925] 1 KB 141, which broadened the scope of recovery to claimants who suffer
shock arising from reasonable fear to themselves or to their children, as a result of witnessing a tragic
event or accident through their own unaided senses.
30. See Linden & Feldthusen, supra note 4 at 425, where they note that "Tort law was slow to grant
protection to the interest in mental tranquility." Linden & Feldthusen later observe, at 434, that "[i]n
the last few years, with reasonable foresight being used as an umbrella theory, more specific contours
of liability for psychiatric injury are coming into focus as the recurring cases are sorted out."
31. The term "primary victim" was first introduced by Lord Oliver in the case of Alcock v Chief
Constable of South Yorkshire Police, [1992] 1 AC 310 HL (Eng) [Alcock]. See John Cooke, Law of
Tort, 10th ed (Essex, England: Pearson, 2011) at 75. Lord Oliver's conception of primary victim has
subsequently been criticized as being too broad and unhelpful. See UK, Law Commission, Liability
for Psychiatric Illness (Consultation paper No 249) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1998)
at paras 5.45-5.53.
32. See Page v Smith, [1995] 2 All ER 736 [Page], per Lord Lloyd.
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personal safety.33 Secondary victims, on the other hand, suffer shock not
from fear of their own safety, but as a result of witnessing serious injury
or death to others with whom they have a close relationship of affection.
In both cases, the requirements of physical and temporal proximity to the
accident must be satisfied in order to successfully establish a claim in
psychiatric injury.34
Interestingly, the decision by the House of Lords in the 1995 case
of Page v. Smith35 added a new twist to the primary/secondary victim
distinction by articulating special rules on remoteness for primary victims
who sustain psychiatric injury. These rules facilitate recovery for primary
victims by blurring the boundary between physical and psychiatric
damage. A primary victim would therefore not need to demonstrate
foreseeability of psychiatric injury if physical injury were a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of the tortfeasor's carelessness. Hence, a primary
victim's physical and psychiatric injuries will be considered together as
components of the same "bundle" of actionable harm flowing from the
defendant's carelessness. Secondary victims, on the other hand, would still
need to demonstrate foreseeability of psychiatric injury, and other control
factors, in order to recover.
While the primary/secondary distinction has generally been cited with
approval in the Canadian jurisprudence, the rule in Page v. Smith has been
received far less favourably, not just in Canada but in other parts of the
Commonwealth.36 The Canadian approach is generally unsympathetic
to the "slightly improved position" of the primary victim recognized by
the House of Lords vis-di-vis psychiatric injury, with some commentators
suggesting that the Supreme Court in Mustapha actually rejected the
approach in Page.37 As mentioned earlier, it is noteworthy that there is
no discussion of Mustapha's status as a victim in the Supreme Court's
decision. It might be inferred from the judgment that whether Mustapha
33. Cooke, supra note 31 at 75 and 80-82; McFarlane v EE Caledonia Ltd, [1994] 2 All ER 1;
Dulieu v White & Sons, supra note 28.
34. See generally Alcock, supra note 31; Frost v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police, [1999]
2 AC 455; and Taylor v A Novo (UK) Ltd, [2013] EWCA Civ 194 (re-affirming the requirement of
proximity both in time and in space for secondary victims.)
35. Page, supra note 32.
36. See Linden & Feldthusen, supra note 4 at 439.
37. Ibid at 428, n 6. See however, Ogilvie, supra note 8 at 89-90, who observes that the Supreme
Court cited with approval Lord Lloyd's assertion inPage v Smith concerning the "elusive and arguably
artificial distinction" between physical and mental injury. This suggests that the Canadian Supreme
Court is not entirely unsympathetic to the decision in Page, by adopting an approach which favours
"a more positive assimilation of physical and mental injury," and by recognizing that "nothing is to be
gained by treating them as different kinds of injury." See also Mustapha, supra note 7 at para 8; Page,
supra note 32 at 759 (per Lord Lloyd).
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was a primary or a secondary victim is not a critical factor in determining
his eligibility to recover. The Supreme Court chose instead to focus on
whether his losses were remote, taking into account his hypersensitivity.
In focussing on the issue of remoteness in evaluating Mustapha's claim,
the Supreme Court wisely avoided the artificial strictures of evaluating
eligibility to recover based on a rigid test of physical endangerment. A
categorical approach based rigidly on the primary/secondary dichotomy
would exclude recoverability for psychiatric injuries without enquiring
sufficiently into the type of endangerment and the nature or severity of
the claimant's actual or anticipated injuries.38 "Physical endangerment" is
a term capable of encompassing a wide variety of situations, as well as a
vast spectrum of anticipated or actual injuries that vary in severity-from
bruises and lacerations to skin cancer and food poisoning. An approach
that treats all injuries as part of a single bundle would not be nuanced
or flexible enough to evaluate whether there is a sufficient causal link
between the endangerment in question and the specific mental injury
suffered by the plaintiff. To take an example, an act of carelessness that
creates a danger of very mild physical discomfort to the plaintiff-such as
temporary gastric pains arising from the failure to adequately re-heat food
for consumption-might not, as a matter of law, be sufficient grounds on
which to pursue a claim in psychiatric injury, even if there is mental harm
or illness accompanying the physical endangerment.
A second factor that militates against using a victim's classification
to evaluate recoverability is the practical difficulty of fitting some
claimants into one of the two categories. Not all forms of actionable
harm are amenable to a simplistic reduction to physical or psychiatric
injury. In some cases, the defendant's carelessness may give rise to the
impression of there being a primary victim, when in fact there is none.
In Farrell v. Avon Health Authority,39 for instance, a new father who
was negligently given someone else's dead baby to hold was allowed to
recover for his psychiatric injuries. Further, a young boy was allowed to
recover in Froggatt v. Chesterfield & North Derbyshire Royal Hospital
NHS Trust,4" upon overhearing a negligent misdiagnosis involving a
close relative. Interestingly, in the CJD Litigation; Group B Plaintiffs v.
38. At a very basic level, physical endangerment may involve an impact to the claimant, or in other
cases, a situation where the claimant's physical safety is threatened by virtue of falling within a zone
of physical proximity to a disaster or accident. See, e.g., Toronto Railway Co v Toms (1911), 44 SCR
268 (decided at a time when damages were only available in cases with actual injury or at least the
presence of a physical impact), and later cases such as Austin v Mascarin, [1942] OR 165 (which
recognized the possibility of damages arising from a reasonable fear for one's personal safety).
39. [2001] Lloyd's Rep Med 458.
40. [2002] AllER (D) 218 (Dec).
Thin-Skull Plaintiffs, Socio-Cultural "Abnormalities" and 759
the Dangers of an Objective Test for Hypersensitivity
Medical Research Council,41 the court refused to classify a claimant who
had been negligently injected with human growth hormone (that could
lead to Creutzfeld-Jacob disease) as either a primary or a secondary
victim. Although the court recognized liability, it was wary of making a
pronouncement on the classification of the claimant's status as a "victim,"
out of concern that any such pronouncement would have an impact on
future cases. These instances highlight the artificiality of using physical
endangerment as a test for whether mental damage is foreseeable, taking
into account the possibility that psychiatric damage can flow not only
from careless acts that can potentially wound or bruise, but also from the
negligent communication of incorrect or misleading information.
The Supreme Court's approach is generally consistent with judicial
trends in Ireland and in other parts of the Commonwealth to avoid rigid
distinctions based on the victim's status. In Curran v. Cadbury (Ireland)
Ltd.,42 McMahon J held that workplace cases of nervous shock victims
need not necessarily be classified as primary or secondary. Furthermore,
even individuals who are traditionally considered "primary victims" may
not be able to recover if their mental injuries are sustained gradually rather
than as a result of nervous shock. The Irish Supreme Court in Fletcher v.
The Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland noted, for instance, that
even victims who are "endangered" will not necessarily be eligible to
recover if their condition is produced by anxiety or irrational fear, rather
than the sudden perception of a frightening event.43
In light of the difficulties in applying the primary/secondary
victim dichotomy uniformly to all claimants citing special or unusual
vulnerabilities, the Supreme Court was on the right track in choosing to
adroitly side-step the issue by refusing to give Mustapha's classification
any weight. This allowed the Court to focus on the salient issues pertaining
to causation of damage, where the remoteness of Mustapha's claim
constituted the primary barrier against successful recovery. Although
the primary/secondary victim distinction was not explicitly overruled,
its utility as a tool for evaluating the presence of a duty of care may be
severely limited, particularly in cases such as Mustapha's, where the
41. [2000] Lloyd's Rep Med 161.
42. [2000] 2 ILRM 343.
43. In Fletcher v The Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland, [2003] IESC 13, the plaintiff was
negligently exposed to asbestos. Despite the fact that he had not contracted either asbestosis or lung
cancer, and that the risk of contracting mesothelioma was "very remote," the plaintiff continued to
worry about his health and was diagnosed as suffering from "reactive anxiety neurosis." See also
Owen McIntyre, "Liability to 'Fear-of-Disease' Victims for Negligent Exposure to Asbestos-the
Position of the 'Worried Well' under Irish Law" (2004) 6:2 Envtl L Rev 111 at 112-113.
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concept of endangerment or harm cannot easily be reduced to a
simplistic dichotomy.
III. The dangers of adopting an "objective" test
When faced with claims from hypersensitive victims, an important
challenge facing courts lies in determining the circumstances under
which personality-based socio-cultural, religious or psychiatric
vulnerabilities can provide a legal basis for an award of additional
compensation to reflect the higher extent of the victims' losses. A
noteworthy feature of the Supreme Court's decision is its application
of the person-of-ordinary-fortitude test in rejecting Mustapha's claim
on grounds of remoteness.44 In choosing to follow the path laid down
in the English and Canadian precedents, the Supreme Court affirmed
the test for ordinary fortitude that had been articulated in cases such as
White v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police45 and Vanek v. Great
Atlantic and Pacfc Co. of Canada Ltd.46 Objective tests of this nature
have had a long (though at times controversial) history in the evolution
oftort law.4" It is therefore not entirely surprising that the Supreme Court
applied a version of the "reasonable person" test-based on the notion
of an individual who possesses the resilience and emotional fortitude
expected of most Canadians-in determining whether Mustapha's
44. Mustapha, supra note 7 at paras 14 and 15.
45. Supra note 9. The ordinary-fortitude standard was applied in this case to police officers
who suffered mental distress after assisting with rescue operations at a major sporting disaster
in England. It was held that the police officers fell short of the standard of mental robustness
required of them and were consequently not eligible to receive compensation for their psychiatric
injuries.
46. Supra note 9. In this case, a couple became obsessed about the health of their 11-year-old
daughter after she consumed some contaminated Beatrice Grape Nectarjuice at school. The child
was ill for a relatively short time, but displayed no alarming symptoms apart from nausea and
regurgitation, and was able to return to school the next day. Nevertheless, the couple continued
to be extremely worried about possible after effects that did not materialize. As a result of this
mental strain, the father was admitted to hospital at a later point. It was held that the parents'
reaction to their daughter's initial illness was not reasonably foreseeable. Accordingly, the parents
were not allowed to recover as they lacked the reasonable robustness and fortitude expected of
Canadians.
47. One example of such an objective standard is the reasonable person, or the man on the
Clapham omnibus. Like the person of ordinary fortitude, the reasonable person is a hypothetical
standard central to the tort of negligence against which the conduct of the defendant is compared.
The standard dates back to cases such as Vaughan v Menlove (1837), 3 Bing NC 468 and
Hall v Brooklands Auto-Racing Club [1933] 1 KB 205 at 224, and continues to be applied in
contemporary Canadian jurisprudence. See Hill v Hamilton Wentworth Regional Police Services
Board, 2007 SCC 41 atpam69, [2007] SCR 129, where McLachlin CJ states: "the general rule is
that the standard of care in negligence is that of the reasonable person in similar circumstances."
It has been observed by Linden and Feldthusen that despite some criticism of the reasonable-
person standard, there has been little evidence of any alteration in this age old standard. See
Linden & Feldthusen, supra note 4 at 148.
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psychiatric injury fell within the bounds of recoverability. The obsessive
compulsive reaction that was "triggered" in Mustapha was deemed to be
abnormal and extreme; a reaction that the "ordinary" Canadian would not
experience upon witnessing a dead insect (or two) in a bottle of water.
Adherence to an objectivized test for liability might appear, at least
at first glance, to be justified or even necessitated by constraints faced
by decision-makers in the field of tort law. Advocates for an objectivized
test might argue that it serves as a control mechanism to ensure that the
scope of negligence liability is kept within manageable limits. In their
quest to demarcate the boundary between admissible and inadmissible
claims, decision-makers arguably perceive the need to formulate some
sort of reference point or threshold beyond which no recovery is legally
permissible. In this regard, an objective standard furnishes a theoretically
attractive and perhaps convenient tool-based on the notional ordinary
person-with which to evaluate the plaintiff's reaction and a basis of
comparison to measure it against.
Yet, while an objective standard might seem theoretically attractive,
how it is applied in practice often hinges on the decision-maker's
individual construction of the ideal or model plaintiff. Tort scholars are
quick to point out the dangers of relying exclusively on a test of idealized
personhood, based on a one-size-fits-all standard, for measuring whether
a vulnerable claimant's response to a tortious act is admissible for the
purpose of awarding additional damages.4" Part of the difficulty with such
a standard is its inability to adequately evaluate vulnerabilities that run
the gamut from underlying psychiatric conditions, socio-cultural factors
and religious beliefs that predispose a claimant to additional mental or
physical harm. A single tortious stimulus may produce a range of different
responses from tort victims in a cross-section of society, depending on
factors that range from age and gender to social conditioning, religion and
cultural upbringing. Therefore, deducing what is considered an admissible
response to a tortious stimulus often hinges upon the decision-maker's
interpretation of "normalcy." The concern with the practical application of
such a test is the risk that decision-makers may imbue the fictional standard
of the ordinary Canadian with biographical traits that they perceive to
48. Anumber of commentators have argued infavour of abolishing the reasonable person test, on the
ground that it is insufficiently accommodative of individuals who differ from dominant conceptions of
"ordinariness" or normalcy, such as children and minority groups. See, e.g., Antony Duff, Intention,
Agency & Criminal Liability: Philosophy ofAction and the Criminal Law (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1990); Mayo Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Person: An Egalitarian Reconstruction of the
Objective Standard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
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be compatible with their own subjectively-held views of strong-nerved
resilience.49
In this vein, adopting a test based on the hypothetical person of
ordinary fortitude might subject claimants to a politically alienating or
culturally polarizing standard of "resilience" if the test is applied in a way
that uncritically dismisses psychological, religious or cultural sensitivities
which depart from the "Canadian mainstream," unless the tortfeasor had
notice of those sensitivities. Of course, not all socio-cultural particularities
or "personality quirks" will necessarily form the basis for a thin skull
claim,50 such as a heightened propensity to worry about cleanliness that
is triggered by a revolting sight of flies in bottled water-a condition
that undoubtedly exacerbated Mustapha's reaction to the "traumatizing
stimulus" in question. However, it is also important to acknowledge
that not all harm flowing from vulnerabilities of a religious, cultural or
psychological nature should necessarily be viewed as falling beyond the
realm of reasonable foreseeability or recoverability.
An interesting example of a thin-skull case that Marc Ramsay suggests
ought to be recognized by the law of negligence on grounds of religion
is that of an injured Jehovah's Witness who refuses a blood transfusion
on faith-based grounds, thereby suffering damages that exceed those
initially caused by the defendant's negligence. 1 The damages sustained
by the victim in this case may extend beyond the initial physical injuries
to include psychiatric illness and additional physical harm flowing from
those initial injuries. 2 One possible alternative scenario to Ramsay's
example would be a Jehovah's Witness who develops severe depression
after being negligently given a blood transfusion.53 The key difference
49. See Moran, ibid at 314-315, who suggests that the reasonable-person test would function more
effectively without the "person" while retaining the "reason."
50. One example is provided by the case ofJaniakvlppolito, [1985] 1 SCR 146 [Janiak] (concerning
an injured victim who refused surgery because of an overwhelming fear of such procedures), where
it was held that not every personality trait or state of mind can provide the legal basis for additional
compensation.
51. See Marc Ramsay, "The Religious Beliefs of Tort Victims: Religious Thin Skulls or Failures of
Mitigation?" (2007) 20 Can JL & Juris 399 at 399.
52. The issue of Jehovah's Witnesses seeking additional compensation for damages arising from
their treatment refusal decisions has been the subject of litigation not only in Canada but also in the
United States. See, e.g., cases such as Williams v Bright, 632 NYS (2d) 760 (NY Sup Ct App 1995);
Munn vAlgee, 730 F Supp 21 (ND Miss 1990) [Munn].
53. There is a line of authority in Canada upholding the principle that a medical professional can be
liable in tort to a patient for performing an unauthorized blood transfusion, particularly if the patient
had expressed objection to such a procedure. See, e.g., Malette v Shulman (1990), 72 OR (2d) 417,
where the patient, a Jehovah's Witness, who was brought in a state of unconsciousness to a hospital,
had given written instructions in the form of a card refusing any blood transfusion. The physician who
performed such a transfusion against the wishes of the patient was held liable for battery.
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between this latter Jehovah's Witness example and Mustapha's case is that
the former involves an established "state of mind" that is protected, or
at least accommodated, under Canada's legal framework, while the latter
condition is evidenced primarily by symptoms or behaviour manifesting
itself after the tortious act. Imposing a blanket exclusionary principle
that rejects all "non-mainstream" religious/cultural factors or psychiatric
vulnerabilities would have the dramatic effect of barring claims from
potentially deserving claimants, such as the injured Jehovah's Witness,
on grounds of remoteness.54 While clearly not all thin-skull claims based
on cultural or religious arguments should be entertained,55 a monolithic
ordinary-fortitude test does not appear to provide a sufficiently nuanced
tool with which to distinguish between deserving cases involving physical
or psychiatric injury flowing from psychological, cultural or religious
vulnerabilities on the one hand and otherwise remote claims on the other.56
Taking into account the Jehovah's Witness example, it might be
surmised that thin-skull cases can be based on cultural or religious factors
in at least two different scenarios, where the possibility of mitigation is
concerned. In one scenario (with the pre-transfusion Jehovah's Witness
who refuses the transfusion) mitigation is physically possible, but the
plaintiff's state of mind or belief system precludes such mitigating action,
resulting in the progressive or dramatic worsening of the injury initially
caused by the defendant's negligence. In the second scenario (with the
Jehovah's Witness who was negligently given an unauthorized transfusion)
the plaintiff's personality-based trait (religious beliefs) aggravates
the mental injury or harm (or perception of harm) resulting from the
54. There is a growing body of literature which explores the intersection between culture, religion
and vulnerability to harm. See, e.g., Black, supra note 3 (tracing developments in the common law
in which cultural factors lead to a finding of additional liability compared to cases where the specific
cultural elements are absent); Ramsay, supra note 51 at 399 (arguing in favour of extending protection
to "religious thin skulls" and distinguishing them from ordinary cases of failure to mitigate).
55. It has been observed that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not indemnify
a practitioner of a certain religion against all costs incidental to the practice of that religion. While
freedom to practice the religion is protected under the Charter, the practitioner may have to bear some
of the costs of adherence, particularly in cases where religious beliefs or practices conflict with the
application of Canadian law. See, e.g., Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37
[2009] 2 SCR 569 at 611-613 [Hutterian Brethren].
56. Ramsay suggests, for instance, that religious beliefs that preclude ordinary mitigation are
comparable to the plaintiff's susceptibility to cancer in Leech Brain. Ramsay also cites as a "religious
thin skull," which precludes ordinary mitigation, the example of Friedman v New York, 54 Misc (2d)
448 (NY Cl Ct 1967), which involved a Jewish woman who jumped off a ski lift that had been shut
down owing to the negligence of the defendant, and suffered facial lacerations as a result. The decision
to jump off the ski lift was motivated by the religious conviction held by the plaintiff, in accordance
with strict rabbinic teachings, that it was impermissible for two unmarried persons to be together
unaccompanied after nightfall. See Ramsay, supra note 51 at 404 in 14 and accompanying main text.
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defendant's negligence. There is no mitigation possible in the ordinary
sense57 because the aggravating factor in a thin-skull case is inherent to the
plaintiff's belief system or personality and cannot generally be removed or
attenuated through a conscious course of action on the part of the plaintiff
without a radical overhaul of the belief system. An appropriate test for
measuring legal causation in thin skull cases should be contextually attuned
to the specific mechanics of harm-to help decision-makers determine the
conditions under which psychological or other factors can form the basis
for an actionable "thin skull" claim.
This article suggests that a multi-factorial contextual test for legal
causation that focuses on the causal nexus between negligence and harm
can help to obviate some of the concerns relating to a fictional objective
standard. A test of contextual foreseeability is preferable to one that is
based on an idealized notion of personhood in that it delinks the test for
liability from a hypothetical fictionalized individual, and situates the
claim in the more specific context of causality. Under this test, claims for
injuries arising from cultural, psychiatric or religious vulnerabilities are
not rejected, ipso facto, by virtue of their peculiarity, or divergence from
the Canadian mainstream, but viewed in light of their causal connection
with the tortfeasor's wrongful act, including a consideration of whether
the victim was aware of the risk of injury by engaging in potentially
dangerous or high-risk activities. 8 Such a test would help forge a more
equitable balance between limiting the scope of recovery, and ensuring
that vulnerable claimants in society do not find their claims rejected
on the sole basis of their divergence from the "Canadian mainstream,"
or judicial interpretations of "ordinariness." Underlying psychological
factors and conditions, including religious beliefs, that might predispose
an adherent to a higher degree of emotional or physical harm, should not
be categorically dismissed as failure to mitigate, but should be examined
57. That is, where the plaintiff freely chooses not to mitigate through an autonomous exercise of
discretion and thus has to bear the consequences of that choice when additional compensation is
denied for losses that could reasonably have been avoided. This may well be the case even if the
disposition or inclination to make such an autonomous choice was present in the plaintiff before the
injury or accident. See, e.g., Munn, supra note 52 at 29.
58. Awareness of danger is an important consideration when adherents to a particular belief system
choose to subject themselves to a higher degree of risk by giving priority to their religious prohibitions
or practices over basic safety precautions. One example is of a Sikh motorcyclist who chooses to
wear his turban instead of a helmet and who is later injured in an accident caused by the negligence
of another driver. See Redko, supra note 10 who observes that some provinces in Canada already
exempt practicing Sikh motorcyclists from wearing the helmet, as seen in legislation such as the Safety
Helmets Standards and Exemptions Regulation to the Highway Traffic Act, CCSM c H60 (Man Reg
167/2000) and the Motorcycle Safety Helmet Exemption Regulation to the Motor Vehicle Act, RSBC
1996, c 318 (BC Reg 237/99).
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in the context of causality, the balance of rights between the plaintiff and
the defendant, 9 as well as whether the victim's claim regarding freedom
of religion is constitutionally protected under the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.6
The current treatment of hypersensitivity under the Canadian tort
of negligence can benefit from some of the insights propounded by
scholars who have explored the significance of religious or socio-cultural
vulnerabilities in the recoverability of civil damages. Marc Ramsay for
instance proposes an interesting battery of tests to distinguish between
"religious thin skulls" (admissible claims for the purpose of recovery)
and ordinary cases of failure to mitigate (not admissible). These tests
can be extended not only to Mustapha's scenario, but to thin skull claims
involving hypersensitivity in general.
Building upon the battery of tests proposed by Ramsay (which relate
primarily to religious thin skulls), a modified list could be formulated
to take into account psychiatric and personality-based vulnerabilities as
well as socio-cultural and religious sensitivities. This modified list would
consist of the following considerations. First, the thin-skull claimant must
be able to adduce strong evidence of a clinically recognized psychiatric
vulnerability or religious/cultural beliefs that pre-date the tortious event,
resulting in additional injury, and were not the result of a post-accident
revelation.61 This pre-existing-condition requirement62 seeks to prevent
claimants from fabricating or concocting religious views (or other
"sensitivities" or vulnerabilities) after the tortiously-caused injury so as
59. Redko, ibidat 71-73.
60. In this respect, Ramsay suggests that whether religious beliefs are respectful of human dignity
and equality may be an important factor in determining whether such beliefs are an admissible ground
for claiming a thin-skull condition In this respect, an injured patient who rejects medical treatment
on the ground that the treating physician is of an "inferior race," and whose condition worsens as a
result, would be treated as a claimant who has failed to mitigate his losses. His racist views would
not qualify as a religious belief that exempts him from ordinary mitigation because of its conflict
with the basic constitutional principle of equality. Hence, to be eligible as a "religious thin skull"
claimant, the religious belief in question should recognise, or at least not reject, the equality of human
individuals. Underlying this principle is that a religious belief seeking protection under the law should
be respectful of the autonomy and basic civil liberties of other individuals in society. See Ramsay,
supra note 51 at 421, n 58 and accompanying main text.
61. See, e.g., Blackstock v Foster [1958] SC (NSW) 341 and Janiak, supra note 50, both of which
preclude the victim from relying on a post-injury revelation or malignancy to claim additional damages
or to reject mitigating action that would otherwise have alleviated the extent of the eventual injury
suffered.
62. The underlying condition requirement as a test for the admissibility of thin-skull claims has been
applied in a number of Canadian decisions. See, e.g., Yoshikawa v Yu (1996), 73 BCAC 253 (CA);
Marconato v Franklin, [1974] 6 WWR 676 (BC SC).
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to avoid their duty63 to mitigate. Second, the religious beliefs in question
(if applicable) must be respectful of the equality and dignity of others in
order to serve as the basis for a successful claim for additional relief on the
ground of hypersensitivity. Hence, under Ramsay's conception of relief
for "religious thin skulls," racist beliefs that induce one to reject medical
treatment from healthcare professionals of a certain ethnicity would be
treated as a case of failure to mitigate, while the religious convictions
of a Jehovah's Witness in refusing therapies involving blood products
might form the basis for an actionable thin-skull claim. 4 Ramsay suggests
that our commitment to equality under Canada's constitution65 requires
us to recognize underlying religious beliefs-provided such beliefs are
consistent with constitutional norms of equality-as forming the basis for
a legitimate thin-skull claim that ought to be distinguished from ordinary
failures to mitigate.
Even if the above requirements are satisfied, a third qualifying criterion
is that of weak perfectionism, which prescribes that a plaintiff is expected,
in the absence of any strong moral prohibition,66 to place one's health and
well-being over and above temporary goals, particularly in cases where
the pursuit of those goals might entail severe cost to one's constitution.
The concept of weak perfectionism distinguishes between goals that might
form an admissible basis for a thin-skull claim (such as compliance with
a religious prohibition), and goals that are unreasonable because they do
not place sufficient value on life and health. 7 These considerations, taken
together, would help courts etch out a multi-factorial test for contextual
foreseeability that distinguishes between claims for which no additional
compensation can be awarded, and underlying conditions that might form
the basis for a viable "thin skull" action.
63. Mitigation is not a legal duty, as such, but failure to mitigate in most cases would result in the
plaintiff being denied recovery for losses or injuries that could reasonably have been prevented. The
essence of some thin-skull cases, however, is that the claimant is seeking compensation for additional
injuries due to (or perhaps in spite of) the fact that reasonable mitigation was not feasible, or in some
cases, impossible.
64. See text accompanying note 60.
65. See Ramsay, supra note 51 at 399-400, and at the main text accompanying note 59, citing R
v Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697. See also Dennis Klimchuk, "Causation, Thin Skulls, and Equality"
(1998) 11 Can J L & Jur 115 at 138 (arguing that a victim's religious beliefs constitute a "zone of
equality," and that the tortfeasor must take responsibility for the consequences of those beliefs by
violating the victim's autonomy and entering into the zone where the victim's benefit or detriment is
evaluated according to those beliefs).
66. See Ramsay, ibid at 418 note 50 and accompanying main text. Ramsay argues that a victim's
religious choices, if consistent with the factors enumerated, are "constitutionally immune" to
perfectionist evaluation.
67. Ibid at 409 and 410 notes 27-28 and accompanying main text.
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Incorporating a test of contextual foreseeability that is inherently
respectful of religious, socio-cultural and psychological diversity, whilst
adhering to the principle of weak perfectionism, would confer the additional
advantage of being more cohesive than the present test-which treats the
defendant's knowledge of the plaintiff's hypersensitivity as a proviso or
qualification to the general rule-by integrating awareness of the plaintiff's
condition into a single test for foreseeability that examines the contextual
nexus of causation, rather than construing it as a separate prong in the
analysis of liability. Knowledge of the plaintiff's hypersensitivity would
preclude a defendant from relying on the person-of-ordinary-fortitude test
as a shield against liability. However, whether or not the defendant had
such knowledge is an integral factor in the foreseeability analysis for legal
causation and should be treated as such, instead of an exception to the
general rule against recovery for hypersensitive claimants.
Another important element that ought to be taken into consideration in
any contextual-foreseeability test for remoteness is whether the claimant
was aware-either at an actual or constructive level-of the risk of
physical injury when engaging in a potentially dangerous activity, such
as high-risk sports or the operation of machinery. A wilful or conscious
refusal to take appropriate safety precautions in such cases-even if the
refusal is based on socio-cultural or religious grounds-may override even
strong evidence of an underlying hypersensitivity or vulnerability that
predated the accident.68 This consideration is perhaps implicitly governed
by Ramsay's weak-perfectionism criterion that the claimant in question
be expected to make appropriate adjustments to their belief systems in
order to protect their personal health and well-being. That being said, the
advantage of a multi-factorial test is that it does not treat these factors as
exhaustive or as criteria to be viewed in isolation, but rather as cumulative
elements to be weighed in accordance with the fact-specific context of
each case.
In sum, a multi-factorial contextual foreseeability test for legal
causation that evaluates the causal nexus between a victim's psychiatric
injury and the tortfeasor's negligence provides a more flexible tool for
determining the admissibility of claims for additional compensation
68. See, e.g., Hutterian Brethren, supra note 55, where it was held that the Charter does not
indemnify religious adherents against all costs incidental to the practice of their religions.
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in thin-skull cases.69 To qualify as an admissible thin-skull case, the
plaintiff must demonstrate clear evidence of an underlying condition that
was present prior to the tortious act that resulted in the initial injury; the
underlying condition being a factor that exacerbated the injury, either by
aggravating its severity, or by precluding ordinary mitigation. However, in
order to ensure that the bounds of liability are kept in check, the underlying
condition of the psychiatric injury victim must be protected by, or at least
compatible with, Charter values respecting equality.
Despite the merits of the Supreme Court's decision in Mustapha
v. Culligan, the issues at stake are far larger than just Mustapha's thin-
skull claim. A multi-factorial contextual foreseeability test would provide
a more flexible tool with which to accommodate and protect a broader
range of vulnerabilities suffered by deserving claimants-vulnerabilities
that would otherwise fall through the net of "ordinary fortitude." While
the fictional standard of the person of ordinary fortitude holds appeal and
might even work in clear-cut cases (such as Mustapha's case), it is perhaps
time for Canadian tort law to jettison this rigid, artificial standard in favour
of a test that is more respectful, tolerant and accommodative of thin-skull
cases involving personality-linked vulnerabilities and mental conditions
that fall by the wayside of the "Canadian mainstream."
Conclusion
The law of tort relating to psychiatric injury has evolved considerably
since the epoch of "physical endangerment" as the basis for liability. Yet
uncertainty still abounds in the area of legal causation in adjudicating thin
skull claims involving some element of religious, cultural or psychiatric
vulnerability.
Despite its apparent clarity and simplicity, Mustapha v. Culligan has
the potential to provoke and inspire new lines of inquiry into the scope
of protection afforded to hypersensitive plaintiffs. On the one hand, the
Supreme Court's decision has demonstrated, quite aptly, that eligibility for
recovery should not be based on rigid categorizations of victimhood, but
on a test for remoteness. Yet, one of the key concerns with the objective
test adopted by the Supreme Court for legal causation is the danger that it
69. This approach recognizes that whether a particular injury-psychiatric or otherwise-is
connected to a negligent act by legal causality is a question not only of law but one of fact, and can
only be determined by a careful weighing of the plaintiff's rights against those of the defendant. The
difficulty of formulating a single rule or standard for evaluating thin skull claims is acknowledged in
the recent literature. See, e.g., Redko, supra note 10 at 44 and 78-79, advocating an individualized
approach that consists of a balancing exercise between the plaintiff's and defendant's rights in each
particular case.
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may uncritically exclude deserving cases (falling outside the "mainstream"
of the Canadian public) from the ambit of protection.
This article has argued against adopting a rigid classification of
victimhood in psychiatric injury cases. It proposes as well the adoption
of a more flexible test-a multifactorial contextual foreseeability test
that focuses on the causal nexus between the defendant's negligence and
the plaintiff's injuries-without categorically excluding claims solely
on the basis of their psychological, cultural or religious particularity or
divergence from the "mainstream." A contextual approach to adjudicating
thin-skull claims that is free from rigid, artificial hypothetical standards
would represent an important step toward greater equity and impartiality
in constructing a fairer system of recovery for vulnerable victims of
negligence in an increasingly multicultural Canada.
I
